The need for safe and secure networked motion control systems have been growing with the increase in the number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. This paper proposes three methods of tamper detection: the maximum delay (MaxD), minimum delay (MinD), and data thresholding (DT) methods, for a networked motion control system. The system has redundant forward network paths from a controller to an actuator and a path selector on the actuator side. The selector chooses an appropriate path without tampering. Error compensation schemes in the path change are also proposed. In the experiments using the three redundant forward paths, the proposed tamper detection methods are compared. Experimental results show that the proposed methods can achieve stable operation of the system even if one of the paths is exposed to data tampering attacks, while each method has advantages and drawbacks.
Introduction
Recently, many things have been connected to the Internet, creating what is called the Internet of things (IoT). Devices that are connected to the Internet can easily be controlled and monitored remotely. A networked control system (NCS) is one of the most attractive areas of research in the field of communications and control engineering [1] . In the NCSs, controllers and plants can be connected by public networks. The trend of research on NCSs has led to the rapid development of networked motion control technologies such as robotics and factory automation [2] . In remote control, the use of the Internet can reduce capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational expenditure (OPEX), and promises flexibility and high reliability [3] . NCSs have a lot of advantages and have already been utilized in many areas. However, there are various factors that make the system unstable as well. For example, there are unavoidable transmission delays, packet losses, quantization errors in analog-to-digital (AD) conversion, and sampling rates [4] .
In the NCSs, in addition to the above-mentioned problems, there is also a security problem, because the Internet is a public and open network [5] . Although there are various kinds of targets, goals, and methods of carrying out cyberattacks, conventional NCSs remain vulnerable to cyberattacks because they have been designed with the assumption that they are to be used in closed networks. The number of cyberattacks is growing with the introduction of information and communication technology (ICT) to control systems. Factories, pipelines, and nuclear power plants have been regarded as targets of cyberattacks. Cars and airplanes have also become targets [6] . With the number of areas where NCSs are being utilized on the rise, attacking the NCSs will cause serious damage to nations, enterprises, and citizens [7] . It is said that the elements to consider in information security are confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA), in order of importance. On the other hand, in control system security, the elements to be considered are availability, integrity, and confidentiality (AIC), in order of importance, because stopping the control system in operation impacts the system significantly.
The NCSs on the Internet are exposed to various kinds of cyberattacks, such as denial-of-service (DoS) and deception attacks [8] . Sasaki et al. proposed a fallback control system when an NCS is exposed to cyberattacks, such as the man-in-the-middle (MitM) and DoS attacks [9] . One of the deception attacks is a false data injection attack [10, 11] . In the false data injection attack, the attacker injects tampering signals into control inputs and/or response signals to operate the plant maliciously. For example, it is reported that a false data injection attack caused a serious problem in a smart grid [12] . In recent years, cybesecurity issues in the NCSs or cyber-physical systems have been discussed [13] . Khalid et al. discussed cybersecurity issues in human-machine collaborative cyberphysical systems [14] . In order to avoid such dangerous situations, making the NCSs safe and secure has become an urgent need, and a lot of studies have proposed ways to address cyberattacks [15] .
In this study, we consider cybersecurity issues in networked motion control systems. A networked motion control system includes a controller, an electric motor as a plant, and communication networks. Tampering, that is, false data injection, of the signals such as the voltage input and the position output is one of the most critical kinds of cyberattacks. Muradore et al. [16] proposed a packet encryption method to achieve secure NCSs. The method can detect tampering and discard tampered packets. However, the system cannot be operated while the attacker tampers the packets. Therefore, this method has a problem with respect to availability. We proposed a tamper detection method using redundant feedback paths from the plant to controller and a tamper detection observer (TDO) for the networked motion control systems [17] [18] [19] . In our previously proposed method, the tampering signal was detected by comparing the redundant feedback signals and output of a plant model. However, the method could not be applied to detect tampering in forward paths from the controller to the plant because it was a model-based approach.
This paper proposes three methods of tamper detection: the maximum delay (MaxD), minimum delay (MinD), and data thresholding (DT) methods, applicable to the forward paths to achieve safe and secure operation of a networked motion control system. The proposed methods detect a tampered control signal at the plant side by comparing the three values received through three redundant forward paths without encryption. If the tampering signal is injected in one of the three redundant paths, the tampered value is different from the other two values. By adopting a kind of majority decision, the plant side can identify the tampered value. However, simply comparing the multiple signals which the plant receives at the same sampling time cannot detect tampering because the redundant forward paths have different transmission delays. In the three proposed methods, the time delays of the forward paths are virtually adjusted. The MaxD method waits for the packet received through the maximum delay path and compares the three packets which are sent simultaneously. Using the MaxD method alone controls the system through the largest transmission delay in the redundant paths. To achieve control with a shorter delay, the MinD and DT methods are proposed. The MinD method uses the values received through the shortest delay until tampering is detected. The DT method uses a threshold for the control input to identify a suspicious tampering signal until tampering is detected. Error compensation schemes in path change are also proposed. The validity of the proposed methods in the networked motion control system is confirmed by experiments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the networked motion control system, disturbance observer (DOB) for robust motion control, and adaptive Smith predictor (ASP) as a time-delay compensation scheme. Section 3 proposes the three methods of tamper detection.
Experimental results are shown in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
Networked motion control
This section describes a conventional networked motion control system with the DOB for robust motion control and the ASP for time-delay compensation. Figure 1 shows the block diagram of a networked motion control system. The communication network contains the forward and feedback transmission delays. In Fig. 1, x cmd , x res , u, T f , T b , and s are the position command signal, position response signal, control input signal, transmission delay on the forward path, transmission delay on the feedback path, and Laplace operator, respectively. The system includes a proportional-derivative (PD) controller G C and an electric motor system G P . The transfer function of the PD controller G C is shown in Eq. (1)
NCS
where 
where K and τ denote the open-loop steady-state gain and open-loop time constant, respectively. The round-trip time (RTT) in the control system, T , is defined as Eq. (3)
In the NCS, the packets exchanged between the controller and the plant are transmitted through the communication network. Therefore, the stability and performance of the system are affected by the delay in the transmission. Conventional networked motion control systems have only one forward path. The networked motion control system is vulnerable to cyberattacks.
DOB
The DOB estimates the system uncertainties as a disturbance d dis [2] . The disturbance includes the modeling errors of system parameters such as the moment of inertia, torque constant, and nonlinear elements. The DOB calculates the estimated disturbanced dis as Eqs. (4) and (5) 
where g dob , G P , and G P n are the cut-off frequency of a low-pass filter (LPF), motor system, and the nominal model of the motor system, respectively. For example, G P n is set as Eqs. (6) and (7) Fig. 1. Networked motion control system (position control).
By using the DOB, it can be considered that the disturbance d dis is an input into the system through the high-pass filter (HPF) whose cut-off frequency is g dob . If the cut-off frequency g dob is large enough, the DOB suppresses the disturbance, and robust motion control is achieved.
ASP
When the packets are transmitted through the network, there are unavoidable delays in transmission. There are some time-delay compensators such as the Smith predictor (SP), ASP, and communication disturbance observer (CDOB) [20] . The SP can only be used for a system with a constant delay. Though the CDOB can compensate time-varying delays and packet losses, filter design based on the characteristics of network disturbance is necessary. The ASP can compensate the time-varying delay and does not need the filter design. In this study, the ASP is used as a time-delay compensator. Figure 2 shows the block diagram of an NCS with the ASP. In Fig. 2 , G P n andT are the nominal plant model and estimated RTT model, respectively. If this system has no delay compensators as shown in Fig. 1 , the transfer function of the system is expressed by Eq. (8)
The transfer function of the system with the ASP is expressed by Eq. (9) x res
The delay estimator measures the RTT between the controller and plant by means of time stamp information of exchanged packets, and updates the RTT model. Therefore, the condition as Eq. (10) is satisfied.T = T
Though the transfer function of the plant G P is not equal to its model G P n , it assumed that the cut-off frequency of the DOB is infinite and the plant can be transformed into G P n . If the cut-off frequency of the DOB is large enough, the Eq. (11) is satisfied.
Using Eqs. (10) and (11), the transfer function of the total control system Eq. (9) is expressed as Eq. (12) Fig. 2. Networked motion control system with the DOB and ASP.
As a result, the time-delay element is removed from the denominator. This ensures that it is no longer necessary to consider the time-delay element when we design the control parameters.
Proposed tamper detection methods
This section proposes three methods to detect data tampering attacks for networked motion control systems with three redundant forward paths. In addition, the error compensation schemes in the path change are also proposed.
Packet transmission using redundant paths
The block diagram of the proposed configuration of the networked motion control system is shown in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 , d 1 , d 2 , and d 3 denote unexpected tampering signals added in forward paths 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In addition, T f 1 , T f 2 , and T f 3 are the transmission delays and p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 are the control inputs of forward paths 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and w is the actual control input sent to the plant. This system includes the redundant three forward paths to compare the control input values and to select the value that is considered correct. If the transmission delays in the three redundant paths are the same, the plant side should receive three packets of the same value, simultaneously. In this situation, the tampering signal can be detected by comparing these values based on a majority decision. However, these three redundant paths usually have different transmission delays. Therefore, a tampered signal cannot be detected simply by comparing the values received simultaneously at the plant side. In this study, it is assumed that the tampering signals are not added simultaneously in multiple paths, and the three paths have different transmission delays.
Tamper detection
On the plant side, it is impossible to know which control input is correct. As shown in Fig. 3 
Algorithm 1 Selection of control input w with the MaxD method at the time t
the values of the packets p 1,t k , p 2,t k , and p 3,t k must not be the same because three redundant paths have different transmission delays.
The three proposed methods of tamper detection are explained as follows. The detection algorithms are executed in the selector shown in Fig. 3. 
MaxD method
The algorithm of the MaxD method is shown in Algorithm 1. The largest transmission delay of the three paths is defined as T max . To compare the three packets sent at the same time, the selector buffers the received packets until the packet sent through the path with the largest delay is received, which is judged based on time stamp information in the packets. After that, the selector compares the values of the three packets sent at the same time and chooses an appropriate value based on a majority decision. The values sent at the same time p n,t k are expressed by p n,t k = p n,t k −T max +T f n (n = 1, 2, 3). The three values p 1,t k , p 2,t k , and p 3,t k should be the same. Therefore, the absolute difference of these values A , B , and C should be equal to 0. If one of these values is different from the others, it is likely that the tampering signal is added to the value. For example, if the tampering signal is added in p 1,t k , A and C are larger than the threshold V th . This threshold is set to a very small value. If A , B , or C is larger than V th , the Boolean tamper is set as TRUE. Otherwise, the Boolean tamper is set as FALSE. If tamper is TRUE, M which is the minimum value of A , B , and C is calculated. For example, if the tampering signal is added in p 1,t k , M is equal to B . The value p 2,t k which is included in B is not the tampered value, then the selector sends this value to the motor as a selected control input w t k .
MinD method
The MaxD method can detect the tampering signal precisely. However, the MaxD method controls the system through the maximum transmission delay of the three redundant paths. In the MinD method, the selector chooses a packet of the path with minimum transmission delay when the tampering signal is not detected. If there are no tampered signals added in the paths, the system is controlled through the minimum transmission delay. The algorithm of the MinD method is shown in Algorithm 2. The variable T min means the minimum transmission delay of the three redundant paths. In the MinD Algorithm 2 Selection of control input w with the MinD method at the time t k for n = 1 to 3 do
method, the basic concept of tamper detection is the same as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 needs two kinds of sorting processes in advance. First, the three transmission delays are sorted in ascending order. We prepare three different variables T min , T mid , and T max . The variable T min is the shortest transmission delay among T f 1 , T f 2 , and T f 3 . The variable T mid is the second shortest transmission delay among T f 1 , T f 2 , and T f 3 . The variable T max is the largest transmission delay among T f 1 , T f 2 , and T f 3 . Second, the path numbers are sorted in ascending order. In Algorithm 2, l 1 means the path number of the shortest transmission delay T min , l 2 means the path number of the second shortest transmission delay T mid , and l 3 means the path number of the largest transmission delay T max .
If the tampering signal is not detected or if it is injected in a path other than the path with the shortest transmission delay, the selector sends the value of the path with the shortest transmission delay p l 1 ,t k to the motor as a selected control input w t k . If the tampering signal is injected in the path with the shortest transmission delay, the selector sends the value of the path with the second shortest transmission delay p l 2 ,t k to the motor as a selected control input w t k .
DT method
The MinD method can control the system through the shortest transmission delay. However, the MinD method may send the tampered signal to the plant as w. For example, it is assumed that the transmission delays satisfy the condition T f 1 < T f 2 < T f 3 , and the tampering signal is added in p 1 . The tampered signal is received at the plant side at the time t a . However, the plant side cannot compare the packets until it receives all the other packets sent at the same time. The plant side can detect the tampered signal at the time t a + T f 3 − T f 1 . Though the tampered signal is added in p 1 from t a to t a + T f 3 − T f 1 , the selector continues to send p 1 as w to the plant while using the MinD method. To strike a balance between secure control and shorter transmission delay, we propose the DT method. The algorithm of the DT method is shown in Algorithm 3.
The variables T min , T mid , T max , l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 are defined in the way as it is defined in Algorithm 2. In the DT method, the basic concept of tamper detection is the same as Algorithm 1, and the MinD method, which cannot detect tampered signal for the period t a ≤ t k < t a + T max − T min , is improved. The DT method identifies a suspicious tampering signal using a data threshold and changes the value to send to the plant. If the control input signal does not fluctuate so frequently, the three values with different transmission delays are nearly the same. If one of the differences of the three values A, Algorithm 3 Selection of control input w with the DT method at the time t k for n = 1 to 3 do
t k end if end if end if
B, and C is larger than the threshold V th , one of the paths is likely to be attacked. The setting of the threshold V th in the DT method is affected by the disturbance and command. A larger threshold suppresses the effects of the disturbance and command in the tampering detection, whereas it becomes difficult to detect a tampering with small fluctuations. On the other hand, a smaller threshold may improve the detection rate, whereas the tampering detection is more affected by the disturbance and control input. If the cut-off frequency of the DOB cannot be set to be large enough to suppress the disturbance sufficiently, the disturbance should be identified in advance and the threshold should be set by considering the uncertainties caused by the disturbance.
If the suspicious path does not have the shortest transmission delay, the selector sends the values of the path with the shortest transmission delay p l 1 ,t k as a control input w t k to the plant. On the other hand, if the suspicious path has the shortest transmission delay, the selector sends the values of the path with the second shortest transmission delay p l 2 ,t k as a control input wt k to the plant. The DT method can control the system with a shorter transmission delay. In addition, the system is not significantly affected by the tampered signal.
Error compensation in path change
The MaxD method waits for the three packets sent at the same time to compare these values. Therefore, the control system is affected by the maximum transmission delay T max , regardless of which value is chosen for the plant by the selector. This means that the system using the MaxD method is equal to the system that has one forward path whose transmission delay is can be generated in any input signals. This kind of input may be generated in constant acceleration control such as elevator control. Figures 4 and 5 show the cases where the received control inputs p 1,t k , p 2,t k , and p 3,t k are delayed by T f 1 = 1, T f 2 = 7, and T f 3 = T max = 11 compared to the transmitted control input u, respectively. In the figures, the tampering signal on path 1 is received during t a = 11 ≤ t k ≤ 23. Here, t a shows the point that the selector starts to receive the tampering signal p 1 , t b = t a + T max − T f 1 shows the point where the selector starts to detect the tampering, and t c shows the point where the selector finishes detection. Each black line in the figures show the value of w t k which the selector sends to the plant at the sampling time t k .
When the MinD method is used as shown in Fig. 4 , the selector sends the tampered values during t a = 11 ≤ t k ≤ t b = 20 to the plant as the control input w t k . At the time t k = t b = 20, the selected path is changed from path 1 to path 2. In addition, at the time t k = t c = 34, the selected path is changed from path 2 to path 1, which means that the selector skips six values from p 2,34 to p 2, 39 . When the DT method is used as shown in Fig. 5 , the selector sends the tampered values p 1,11 and p 1, 12 to the plant as the control input w t k . Even if the DT method is used, the tampered values that do not exceed the threshold cannot be detected. At the time t k = 13, the selected path is changed from path 1 to path 2, since |p 1,13 −p 2,13 | > V th and |p 3,13 −p 1,13 | > V th are satisfied. However, during 13 ≤ t k ≤ 16, the selector sends the values sent before, again. The values p 1,t k (7 ≤ t k ≤ 10) and p 2,t k (13 ≤ t k ≤ 16) are the same. In addition, at the time t k = t c = 34, the selected path is changed from path 2 to path 1, which means that the selector skips the six values from p 2,34 to p 2, 39 . The skipped and duplicated control inputs may degrade the control performance. Therefore, we propose path-changing error compensation schemes in the MinD and DT methods.
The algorithms of the MinD and DT methods using the path-changing error compensation are shown in Algorithms 4 and 5, respectively. In the algorithms, T mid means the second shortest transmission delay. If the Boolean tamper changes from FALSE to TRUE, the system might be tampered with during t a ≤ t k ≤ t b . If the tampered signal is injected in the path with the second shortest transmission delay p l 2 ,t k or the largest transmission delay p l 3 ,t k , the selector sends the value of the path with the shortest transmission delay p l 1 ,t k to the plant as the control input w t k . In this case, secure control with shorter delay is achieved because the system is not affected by the tampering signal. However, if the tampered signal is injected in the path with the shortest transmission delay p l 1 ,t k , the effects Algorithm 4 Selection of control input w with the MinD method using error compensation at the time t k for n = 1 to 3 do
Algorithm 5 Selection of control input w with the DT method using error compensation at the time
of not only the tampering signal, but also the skipped and duplicated values, should be removed. To remove the effects of the tampered signal
are subtracted after the time t b . Using the above scheme, it can be considered that the control inputs are 0 and the motor does not move during t a ≤ t k ≤ t b . Therefore, the values of p l 1 ,t a−1 and p l 2 ,t b are continuously sent to the motor. At the time t c , to remove the effects of skipped values, the selector sends the value of p l 2 ,t k + p l 1 ,t k during t c ≤ t k < t c + T mid − T min to the motor.
Experiment
This section shows the experimental results to confirm the effectiveness of the three proposed methods and path-changing error compensation schemes. Figure 6 shows the experimental system. The system comprised a direct current (DC) servo motor and a controller. In the experiments, we implemented the components except for the motor into the controller shown in Fig. 6 . The PD controller G C , ASP, three redundant forward paths, feedback path, selector, and DOB were implemented in the controller. All the transmission delays on the paths were emulated in the controller virtually. The experiments compared the conventional and proposed methods. It is assumed that the conventional method has only one forward path and does not have any countermeasures against cyberattacks.
Setup
The control parameters of K p and K d are designed as Eq. (13)
to achieve critical damping. The transfer functions of the controller G C and the plant G P are expressed by Eqs. (14) and (15), respectively.
G C = 0.0166 400 + 40 100s s + 100 (14)
The parameters for the experiments were set as Table I . The threshold V th was designed by considering only the command and set by trial and error, since the cut-off frequency of the DOB could be large enough to suppress the disturbance. Figure 7 shows the tampering signals added to the three forward paths. These were the sinusoidal waves of a 50-V amplitude and a 10-Hz frequency. In the conventional method, only tampering signal d 1 was added in the forward path. The tampering signals are generated in the controller virtually. In Fig. 7 , d n corresponds to d n shown in the block diagram of Fig. 3. 
Results
The experimental results of the conventional method are shown in Fig. 8 . The conventional method had only one forward path. Path 1 was affected by the tampering signal d 1 . The position response could not track the position command while the tampering signal was added. Figure 9 shows the experimental results of the MaxD method. Regardless of which path was tampered, the MaxD method could select the correct control input. The position response could track the position command even if the tampering signals were injected on one of the forward paths. However, in the MaxD method, the RTT of this system was equal to 100 ms, which was compensated by the ASP. The transient response was distorted by the large transmission delay. The MaxD method does not need the path-changing error compensation scheme as explained previously. Figure 10 shows the experimental results of the MinD method without path-changing error compensation. Unlike the MaxD method, the MinD method was affected by the tampering signal. The control performance was degraded by the tampering signal, and the position response could not track the position command. The MinD method generated steady-state errors. The experimental results of the MinD method with path-changing error compensation is shown in Fig. 11 . No steady-state errors were observed while sing the path-changing error compensation scheme. Since the MinD method could select the path with the shortest transmission delay, the distortion caused by the large transmission delay was suppressed. Figure 12 shows the experimental results of the DT method without path-changing error compen- sation. Similar to Fig. 10 , the DT method generated large steady-state errors. Figure 13 shows the experimental results of the DT method with path-changing error compensation. Similar to Fig. 11 , the path-changing error compensation scheme suppressed the steady-state errors. Since the DT method could select the path with the shortest transmission delay except the path which the tampering signal was injected in, it avoided performance deterioration caused by the large transmission delay as shown in the MaxD method. The tampered signal which degraded the control performance in the MinD method was also suppressed. Each of the three proposed methods has advantages and disadvantages. The MaxD method can reliably detect the tampering and has the least amount of calculation, while it is most affected by transmission delays. The MinD method controls the system with the shortest transmission delay, while being the most affected by tampered signals. The DT method provides intermediate performance between the MaxD and MinD methods with respect to safety and control performance, and can be used in any situation, while it needs the largest amount of calculation and is affected by the command dynamics.
In the experiments, the cut-off frequency of the DOB could be large enough to suppress the distur- bance such as modelling errors. Therefore, the ASP and the proposed tempering detection methods worked well. However, there is a case where the cut-off frequency is limited by system noises and cannot be set to a large value. In that case, the detection accuracy of the DT method may be deteriorated. It is noted that the tampering detection in the MaxD and MinD methods is not affected by the control performance, because these methods just compare three buffered inputs. These inputs are the same unless the tampering signal is injected. On the other hand, the tampering detection in the DT method may be affected by the control performance. The DT method determines whether the received values are correct or not by comparing three inputs without buffering. The compared three inputs are transmitted by the controller at different timings. The temporal variation of the inputs depends on the system characteristics including the disturbance. Therefore, the thresholding process using V th in the DT method may be affected by the unpredictable disturbance if the cut-off frequency of the DOB is not large enough. In other words, a low cut-off frequency of the DOB may deteriorate the detection accuracy, since the DOB cannot suppress the disturbance sufficiently in that case. If the cut-off frequency of the DOB cannot be large enough to suppress the disturbance, the threshold V th used in the DT method should be determined appropriately so as to avoid false detections by considering the characteristics of not only the command but also disturbance.
Conclusion
This paper proposed tamper detection methods using three redundant forward paths and three selection algorithms of a correct control input to achieve safe and secure operations of the networked motion control system. The experimental results showed that the proposed methods could detect the tampered signal and selected the correct control input appropriately. The MaxD method selected the correct value based on majority decision and achieved secure networked motion control. In the MinD method, the selector sent the value of the path with the shortest transmission delay to the plant and achieved motion control with the shortest delay. The DT method used the threshold for early tamper detection and achieved secure motion control with shorter transmission delay. The proposed methods had different features with respect to the safety, control performance, and algorithmic complexity. The safest method was the MaxD method, which could reliably detect the tampering at the expense of control delay unless the tampering signals were injected simultaneously. The control with the shortest transmission delay could be performed by the MinD method at the expense of the safety. The DT method provided intermediate performance between the MaxD and MinD methods with respect to safety and control performance at the expense of algorithmic complexity. Our further studies include the consideration of the jitters of the transmission delays and packet losses. In addition, the proposed methods based on majority decision cannot detect the tampering added to multiple paths simultaneously. Therefore, the algorithms to change the number of redundant paths depending on circumstances are also included in our future works.
